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evident intent of the legislature was not to subject the property of
wholly innocent persons to such a lien. He further contends that the
words "under control of" cannot mean other people's property under
the control of the guest, but rather property belonging to the guest
under the control of the guest. The judge stresses the fact that the
extraordinary protection afforded the innkeeper at common law is no
longer necessary since his responsibility for a guest's goods has been
greatly modified by other statutes. Ohio G.C. sections 5981, 5982,
5983. These specifically limit the innkeeper's responsibility. Thus,
since the reason for the common law rule giving the innkeeper extra-
ordinary protection has ceased to exist, it seems that the rule itself should
be discarded. A more just rule would protect chattel mortgagees who
have given constructive notice of their prior rights by filing as provided
in the recording act. PHILIP AULTMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LEGISLATIVE SUCCOR FOR THE MOTOR CAR DEALER'
Recent years have heard from all sides the cry of overcrowding in
business, of unfair competitive practices, and of ruinous competition. The
retail end of the motor car industry has been no exception. Conspicuous
among its troubles have been the competition of the fly-by-night seller in
the sale of new cars, and of the finance companies in the sale of repos-
sessed and rebuilt cars, the junk dealers, the abuse of automobile financ-
ing, price cutting through the devices of dumping and excessive trade-in
allowances, the traffic in stolen cars, and the bootlegging of cars from
other states. But back of these tribulations lies the fact that various
economic factors have spawned a host of automobile dealers, the conse-
quences of which have been a large percentage of failures and a very
low margin of net profit.' Studies of the Research Division of the
N. R. A. reveal that at the end of 1934, there were Io6,ooo automobile
retail outlets in the United States, with the average dealer grossing
between $3o,ooo and $5o,ooo yearly.2 Forty-two per cent of all
dealers sold less than fifteen cars per year, forty per cent between fifteen
and seventy-five and less than eighteen per cent over seventy-five.3 The
" Clark, "Make Money Little Businessman or Else," The Saturday Evening Post,
July 30, 1938, at 23.
U. S. National Recovery Adm., Evidence Studies, So Preliminary Draft zz.
a lid at 23. It is very improbable that dealers selling less than fifteen cars annually
will show a profit. Yet incidental and overhead expenses increase only slightly with the
increase in the number of cars sold and by eliminating the sub-marginal dealer a substan-
tial profit would be available to those remaining.
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situation was revealed to be more acute in some states than in others;
it is more than a coincidence that in Wisconsin, the first state to bring
to the retailer of motor vehicles the legislative succor of the newer
design, the average number of cars sold had hit a low of eighteen.4
Business men, instead of solving their troubles around a conference
table and "putting their own house in order," have carried them to the
legislature.5 Cure-all legislation for the automobile dealers, as with many
but not all industries and businesses, had its conception and early experi-
ence under the National Industrial Recovery Act. Retail automobile
dealers were covered by a code.6 Aside from the wages and hours pro-
visions, significant features of this code were the comprehensive compu-
tation of maximum trade-in allowances, the restriction of a dealer to his
own enfranchised territory, and the inclusion within the code of dealers
in towns of less than 2,500 population. This last provision, contrasting
with the general N. R. A. principle of excluding the smaller towns
where business was confined to "local areas," 7 attests the pungency of
the price competition existing between the big city and the country village
dealer. The evils aimed at were thus those competitive practices most
immediately concerned with the ravages of price-cutting. Far from
embracing any direct or indirect device for the limitation of numbers,
the code carried the customary provisions against monopolistic tendencies.
Contemporaneous with the demise of the N. R. A. in 19358 came
NUMBER OF RETAIL OUTLETS, NEW CAR PASSENGER REGISTRATION, AND AVERAGE
NUMBER OF CARS SOLD PER DEALER IN FOUR STATES DURING 1934:*
Total Number Number of Number of Average Num-Retail Outlets New Passen- ber of Cars
of Primarily ger Car Sold by
Retail Outlets Selling Cars Registrations Each Dealer
Ohio ........ 5730 2o3 101,213 5o
Wisconsin .... 3375 .620 28,308 iS
Iowa ........ 3290 1375 27,z86 20
Nebraska .... 1873 870 x6,393 19
* Source: U. S. National Recovery Adm.) Evidence Studies, I Preliminary Draft Z3, zS;
So Preliminary Draft z, 22, 23. The four states for which figures are here
given are the four in which has taken place legislative action of the newer type
discussed infra.
For a discussion of legislation of similar import see Legis. (1937) 2z Iowa L.
Rev. 736.
aPrentice-Hall, z Fed. Trade and Indus. Serv. sec. 13161.1 to 13161.46.
71Iid. Sec. 8335. Application of the code to dealers in small towns was authorized
by executive order.
" A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 49S, 79 L. Ed. 15701SS S. Ct. 837 (1935).
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the pronounced advent of the Fair Trade Acts.' Sustainment of the
California and Illinois Acts in 1936 by the Supreme Court of the United
States'" provided a final stimulant that has placed a Fair Trade Act on
the statute books of all but a handful of states. 1 And this wave of
legislation was closely followed by a significant, though less extensive
wave of Unfair Trade Practices Acts. 2 Although designed primarily
as an aid to the independent druggists and other groups in their struggle
against the chain, this resale price maintenance and sale-below-cost legis-
lation seemed to offer a potential haven to the harassed automobile
dealers, stalked again by the spectre of price cutting. Fair Trade Acts,
though operative only as to new-car prices, could be made applicable, it
has been contended,' 3 on the theory that an excessive trade-in allowance
in effect constitutes a cutting of the price of the new automobile. With
at least those Unfair Trade Practices Acts which comprehensively define
sale-below-cost, applicability to the automobile market can argumenta-
tively be spelled out on the proposition that the resale price of the used
car would have to include not only the amount of the trade-in allowance
but also all reconditioning, overhead and selling expenses, thus placing
a strong indirect deterrent upon the practice of granting excessive allow-
ances in the sale of new cars.' 4 Efforts to put the statutes to work in
the cause of a more rationalized marketing of cars have varied from
state to state. Thus in Ohio, there has been no resort to the state fair
trade act for this purpose; while in Montana dealer groups are said to
be now engaged in trial litigation under the unfair trade practices act.1"
In underlying spirit such legislation bears a close kinship to the Retail
Autumobile Code of the N. R. A. days; there is the same reliance upon
price control devices to cure the ills of depressed businesses. This iden-
tical philosophy again reasserted itself, this time in legislation addressed
directly and exclusively to the motor car dealer, in a Pennsylvania enact-
ment of I937." Fashioned after the automobile dealers' code it was
" California in 1931 adopted the first Fair Trade Act. In 1935 Illinois, Iowa, Mary-
land, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin adopted
Eimilar acts.
' Old Dearborn Dist. Co. v. Seagrams Dist. Corp., z99 U.S. 183, Si L. Ed. sog
(936); Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales, 299 U.S. 198, 81 L. Ed. 122 (x936).
" Legis. (x937) zz Corn. L. Q. 44; Oppenheim (x939 Supp.) RECENT PRICE CON-
TROL LAWS 13.
' Unfair Trade Practices acts of this type have been enacted in Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. For a
summary of the state statutes see Oppenheim (939 Supp.) RECENT PRICE CONTROL
LAw5 63.
"Nat'l Automobile Dealers Assoc. Bulletin, Oct. zi, 1937-
"Nat'l Automobile Dealers Assoc., 8 Legis. Bull., Sept. 30, 1937.
' Personal interview with Mr. John Barton, Executive Secretary of the Columbus
Automobile Dealers' Assoc., May 2, X939.
"' Purdon, 7S Penn. Stat. 1301 el seg. (1937).
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essentially a price-fixing statute designed to put an end to "unfair" price
practices through a requirement of adherence in all cases to a price set
by a state appraiser of used cars. An early declaration of the invalidity
of the law'" effectively prevented proceedings to carry it into operation.
The basis assigned for the act's constitutional infirmity, that the business
was not one affected with a public interest, reflects the continued reluc-
tance of the state courts to condone governmental price control, despite
the Supreme Court's apparent change of heart.'"
Meanwhile, other developments concerning car dealers were occur-
ring on the legislative front. Introduction in numerous states of sales
taxes as an antidote for Mother Hubbard state treasuries added the com-
plaint of out-of-state competition to the list already confronting dealers
located in the border cities where neighboring jurisdictions managed to
do without this type of taxation. Use taxation, judicially affirmed in
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.'" and capable of effective enforcement
in the case of motor car purchases beyond state lines, offered a solution.
Dealer groups have been active from the start in the furtherance of such
a form of taxation and today thirteen states balance sales taxation with
taxation of use.2" Product of the same years, having originated in Wis-
consin in 1935, but of much broader significance is legislation requiring
the licensing of all dealers in motor cars. Sponsored in nearly every state
at the instigation of dealer groups,2 it has been adopted in four states
2
though definitely rejected in another six. 23 Under these acts there are
a total of twenty-nine different causes for which a dealer's license may
be denied, revoked or suspended. Denial upon proof of unfitness or bad
business repute, a material misstatement in the application, a fraudulent
sale, transaction or repossession, and non-compliance with the act or with
administrative regulations are provisions common to all.24 Wisconsin
17 Heinel Motors Inc. v. Teefy, 295 Commonwealth Docket (937), Dauphin County
Court; noted (939) 43 Dick. L. Rev. 127 at 136.
18 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 50Z, 78 L. Ed. 940 ('934); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 81 L. Ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937)-ig 300 U.S. 577, 81 L. Ed. 814 (1937).
o Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. For comment on use taxation see Note
(1938) 6 Univ. of Chic. L. Rev. 2255 Note (x937) 2S Geo. L. J. 714.
" (Oct. 1938) 4 Automobile Facts 3.
22 Ohio G.C. sec. 6302-1 (937); Wis. Stat. sec. zx8.oi (1937); Neb. Sess. Laws
1937, c. 243; Iowa Reg. Sess. Acts, 47 G.A. 1937, c. 135. To these might be added the
Texas statute which conferred upon the cities broad power to license motor vehicle dealers
as to regulation, supervision and control. Harlow's Texas Sess. Laws 2937, Title z8 c. 6.
According to the Automobile Manufacturers Assoc., General Statement, Nov. iS, 1938,
Dallas and Houston are the only cities which have taken advantage of the enabling act
and have adopted the same special control as provided for in the Wisconsin statute.
2 Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
24 Automobile Manufacturers Assoc., Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Laws, Nov. iS,
specifically regulates the relation between the manufacturer and the
dealer; Nebraska makes excessive trade-in allowances and a violation of
the fair and unfair trade acts grounds for adverse action; Ohio requires
a dealer to be solvent and able to meet potential judgments, and demands
an established place of business which is used solely and exclusively in
automobile selling.
Emphasis is clearly upon dealer interests; alone among the twenty-
nine bases in emphasizing the interests of the buyer are the Wisconsin
and Nebraska provisions relating to dishonest treatment of the retail
customer. In this the newer legislation follows the earlier legislative
efforts in aid of the distressed motor car dealer. But here the parallel
ends. While price-cutting remains as a recognized problem, other unde-
sired practices are likewise condemned. And more than this, definition
of "unfair" practices is now not an end in itself but a means to an end,
the restriction of numbers. This change in underlying approach remains
beneath the surface, for the bases of denial, revocation, or suspension are
formulated and expressed in terms of the trade practices regarded as most
offensive. Yet there can be little question that in the background,
actually or potentially, is a conception of control through limitation.
The most recent proposals for legislative succor of the motor car
dealer reveal this tendency in bold relief. Nor does their rejection in the
three states where they were but lately introduced25 lessen their signifi-
cance in the legislative history of efforts to aid the dealer in automobiles.
Taking a cue from the public utility regulatory field, these proposals,
identical in their basic import, contemplated that the right to engage in
the retail automobile business should be conditioned upon a showing to
state administrative officials of a "public convenience and necessity."
Unlike the enactments now on the statute books of four states, this type
of law looks, for the test of the right to enter, beyond the internal factors
of the business itself to a general supply-and-demand formula; and by
the same token it confirms the view that the movement for legislative
aid to the motor car dealer has abandoned the N. R. A. model for one
streamlined after the current fashion to solve the economic ills of par-
ticular businesses by restricting entry into them.
Legislative action looking to actual or potential limitations on those
who may engage in private enterprise runs headon into the economic and
legal philosophy that predicates the common good upon comparative
freedom of individual action and proclaims the openness of a business to
all who choose to enter. At the same time such legislation precipitates
friction with the imbedded hostility to anything smacking of restraint
'Wisconsin (1937), Illinois (1938) and Washington (1938).
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and monopoly. Out of these cross-currents there has arisen a judicial
technique which strikes a balance among the clashing factors. It is the
not uncommon technique, as its use on various constitutional fronts will
attest, of sublimating the basic issue in terms of better accepted categories
of constitutional theory, a method which permits of judicial relaxation,
with seeming orthodoxy, and at the same time retains in the courts a
control over the new economic currents. Thus here, the issue is not
squarely met for what it is-rehabilitation of distressed enterprises
through limitation of the number of business units-but is redefined as
a problem in the preservation of the public safety, the public health, or
what not. Provided only that the control sought can be related to some
such public interest, the courts approve that which, if they were forced
to meet it naked, they would very often deny.
"Public health," even though the connection be vague, has supplied
the magic necessary for favorable judicial reaction in many cases. Thus
the requirement of a certificate or license has been sustained for the
practice of medicine, 28 dentistry,27 optometry,2" chiropractic29 and phar-
maceutics,3" undertaking,31 barbering 2 and plumbing, 3 for the seller
of medicine, poison and drugs, 4 liquors,35 and for milk dealers3" and
vendors in open city markets.3" "Profession" supplies a legalistic key that
has been held to justify the licensing of lawyers, 8 bankers,30 account-
ants,4" stock brokers, 4 commission merchants42 and wheat buyers43 in
agricultural states, where from the very nature of the business, fraud and
imposition is likely or a high degree of integrity, training and capacity is
essential. But that the courts are reluctant to extend the concept of
"profession" to the more common callings, thus affording actual or
"
0Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. I24, 32 L. Ed. 623 (1889).
2' Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 71 L. Ed. 331 (2926).
28 Commonwealth v. S. S. Kresge Co., 267 Mass. 145, 166 N.E. 558 (igzg).
"'State Board v. Fife, 16z La. 681, xi1 So. 58 (gz6). Aff'd 274 U.S. 720 (1927)-3o State v. Wood, 51 S.D. 485, 225 N.W. 487 (927).
" State v. Rice, 225 Md. 317, 8o Atl. zoz6 (1911).
a State v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750 (1904); State v. Zeno, 79 Minn. So,
8x N.W. 748 (i9oo).
"
3New Castle v. Withers, 291 Pa. 216, 139 Atl. 86o (927); Douglas v. People,
225 IlL 536, 8o N.E. 342 (907); Replogle v. Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S.W. 353
(1924).
243 State Board of Pharmacy v. Matthews, 197 N.Y. 353, 90 N.E. 966 (29io).
s State v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S.E. 759 (1898); License cases, . How. (U.S.)
504, 2z L. Ed. 256 (1847).
26People v. Dep't. of Health, 289 N.Y. 187, 8z N.E. 187 (1907).
17 Ash v. People, ii Mich. 347 (z863); White v. Kent, i Ohio St. 550 (286o).
" Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 230, 22 L. Ed. 44z (1872).
"
0Engle v O'Malley, 229 U.S. iz8 (1921).
'0 State v. DeVerges, 153 La. 349, 9S So. 8o5 (2923).
"'Hall v. Geiger-Jones, 242 U.S. 539, 61 L. Ed. 480 (1917).
,a State v. Edwards, 94 Minn. 225, 202 N.W. 697 (2905).
'
2 W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U.S. 452, 45 L. Ed. 619 (1go).
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potential means for limitation of numbers, is shown by judicial reaction
to licensing and other restrictive legislation in the case of paper hangers,
horseshoers, photographers, and insurance salesmen. With the first two,
the decisions are unfavorable to restriction,44 while a split in judicial
attitude has appeared in the case both of photographers4 5 and insurance
agents." No possible relationship can be shown to public health by
licensing car dealers, nor is it likely that the "profession" concept will
be extended to a calling where no specialized training or capacity is
necessary. But through the concept of public safety, a reasonable connec-
tion to the police power can be demonstrated. Physical safety of the
owner and travelers on the highways is improved by preventing the sale
of unsafe second-hand cars, by requiring a dealer to inspect al cars before
sale and making the necessary repairs on them. 7 Licensing of locomo-
tive engineers," stationary steam operators,49 architects and electricians,"0
and regulation of dealers in dangerous commodities"' has afforded suf-
ficient physical safety to the public to justify licensing. Other statutory
bases in the licensing of car dealers, such as fraudulent transactions and
prohibiting such evils in car financing as the "pack,"'" could be brought
within the orbit of the "profession" category, yet they would seem to
be classified more effectively as bearing a relation to the financial security
of the general public and classed under the general head of safety.
If these considerations be not enough, there is now available to legis-
lative enactments before the judicial bar, an emboldened presumption
of constitutionality. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
have carried the presumption far beyond the O'Gorman rule,"' under
"'Bcsette v. People, 93 Ill. 334,6z N.E. 255 (19o) (horseshoers)i Dasck v. Jack-
son, 170 Md. 255, 183 At. 534 (1936) (paperhangers).
"'State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938), criticized in Note (938)
zS Va. L. Rev. 219, held that licensing valid. Terr. v. Fritz Kraft, 33 Hawaii 397 (1935)
held it to be an unconstitutional exercise of the police power in that it imposed an unwar-
ranted restriction upon the rights of the citizen to engage in an innocent calling that bears
no reasonable relation to the health, morals or safety of the public.
" La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 63 L. Ed. 36z (5959) held licensing
based on residence constitutional. But Northwestern Mutural Ins. Co. v. Fishback, 530
Wash. 490, 228 Pac. 5S6 (59z4) held invalid a regulation which prohibited fire insurance
companies from having more than one agent in a city on the ground that it deprived
citizens of the right to engage in a lawful calling without any relation to the police power
of the state.
'" Clark, note z supra; Barton, note 55 supra.4 0 Nashville, C. C.: St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, zz8 U.S. 96, 3z L. Ed. 352 (1888).
"People v. Fournier, 175 Mich. 364, 141 N.W. 689 (953).
"Klafter v. State Board of Examiners, z59 Ill. x5, 5o2 N.E. 593 (1953); Ex parte
Cram er, 62 Tex. Crim. Rep. ii, x36 S.W. 61 (igis).
W' 'adhams Oil Co. v. Tracy, 145 Wis. ISo, 123 N.W. 785 (5909).
This is a common device used by dealers to add from five to seventy-five dollars on
the finance charges without the knowledge of the purchaser.
6a O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.s. 251, 75 L. Ed. 324
(5931).
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which, if no evidence is introduced to show the unreasonableness of the
legislation, it is sustained. Today, the Court, analogizing to the reversal
of a trial court by an appellate court on the weight of the evidence,
employs the presumption to justify legislation if any substantial evidence
whatsoever can be mustered in its support, 4 thus in substance returning
to the judicial attitude which prevailed in the early days of due process."
Establishment of the general power of the state to license or other-
wise control those who engage in business enterprise does not, however,
justify the manifold forms which limitation may take. Nowhere is the
existence of this two-fold constitutional hurdle better revealed than in
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in New State Ice
Co. v. LDebmann. 0 Mr. Justice Sutherland for the Court "conceded
that all businesses are subject to some measure of public regulation. And
that the business of manufacturing, selling or distributing ice, like that
of the grocer, the dairyman, the butcher or the baker may be subjected
to appropriate regulations in the interest of the public health cannot be
doubted; but the question here is whether the business is so charged with
a public use as to justify the particular restriction above stated."" That
particular restriction was the denial of the right to manufacture, sell or
distribute ice where the existing licensed facilities adequately met the
public convenience and necessity. The Court's condemnation of such
a limitation, Justices Brandeis and Stone dissenting, was predicated
largely upon the proposition that the ice business was not one affected
with a public interest. Although this intermingling of the two concepts
of public interest and public convenience and necessity has been criti-
cized, it possibly holds the key to what has in the past been the prevailing
judicial attitude. For the courts of yesteryear at least were firm believers
in the efficacy of free competition as the guide to economic conduct and
viewed with alarm any 'governmental repudiation of the principle of a
competitively-determined market price. Only after extended experience
with utility rate wars, poor service, and dual telephone systems would
courts admit the inefficacy of the competitive principle in the utility field
and allow to pass through the portals of due process an alien system
combining restriction in units with governmental determination of price.
Limitation through outright pegging of the number of units in a busi-
ness, such as is involved in a measure adopted from the utility field, was
54 Kress & Co. v. Johnson, 299 U.S. s1, 81 L. Ed. 378 (1936); see also the dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Black in Polk & Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 83 L. Ed. 73 (1938). The
use of the presumption in the Kress case is discussed infra.
" It is significant that the Court in the Kress case and especially Mr. Justice Black in
his dissent in the Polk case, placed reliance upon Powell v. Pa., 127 U.S. 678, 3z L. Ed.
253 (1888).
Go 285 U.S. 262, 52 S. Ct. 371 (193Z).
07 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, supra at 273, Sz S. Ct. at 372.
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thus unlikely to obtain judicial affirmation unless the business involved
could be demonstrated to be within the charmed circle of "affectation."
Citation is unnecessary to support the statement that this judicial complex
is on the wane; yet sufficient of it remains to cast a cloud of doubt upon
the validity of the proposals to condition entry into the business of vend-
ing motor cars upon an admitted formula of necessity and desirability. "8
Unlike these most recent proposals, the statutes now in effect in the
four states of Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio and Wisconsin find their formulae
for limitation in trade practices and problems of business ethics which
beset the industry. While this approach, by making possible a defense
of the legislation in terms more acceptable than that of naked economic
limitation, in general sets the stage for a more favorable judicial reaction
than that likely in the case of a frontal attack on excessive competition,
some of the conditions imposed raise special questions of constitutionality.
As earlier pointed out, all four statutes specify as one condition precedent
a demonstration of ethical fitness. Ohio and Iowa deny a license to a
dealer of "bad business repute;" Nebraska and Wisconsin withhold the
right to deal in motor cars upon "proof of unfitness of the applicant."
The uncertainty of meaning implicit in the use of such phrases raises
a question as to the reconciliation of such statutory guides for adminis-
trative conduct with judicial notions of the limits within which the
delegation of legislative and judicial power must be canalized. Sustain-
ment by the Supreme Court, in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 9 of the "bad
business repute" phraseology of the Ohio Blue Sky Law, together with
the court's earlier approval of a standard sounding in terms of "good
character and reputation,"" makes a strong prima facie case for validity.
The issue is not, however, entirely free from doubt. There are state
decisions rejecting the standards of "unprofessional conduct,"'" "exper-
ience, ability, and general reputation for integrity,"" and "competent
and trustworthy."'' Competency and especially trustworthiness would
seem to be component elements in the make-up of business fitness and
business repute, yet the Ohio Supreme Court, followed later by an
inferior Ohio court, declared such a test of qualifications so indefinite
as to involve an unwarranted delegation of power. The United States
Supreme Court in constitutionally affirming the Ohio censorship statute
distinguished the Ohio decision on the grounds that the legislative power
" See note 25, supra.
2. 42 U.S. 539, 61 L. Ed. 480 (1917).
"Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 44. L. Ed. 725 (19oo).
d"Mathcws v. Murphy, Z3 Ky. L. Rep. 75o, 63 S.V. 785 (9os).
'-Pcople v. Beckman & Co., 347 II. 92, 179 N.E. 43S (5932).
"Harmon v. State, 66 Ohio St. 249, 64. N.E. 117 (9o2); Toledo v. Winters, 25
Ohio Dec. 171, 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 577 (1910).
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was completely exercised and the law was "perfect, final and decisive in
all of its parts, and the discretion given only relates to its execution,"
leaving intact the judicial disaffirmance by the Ohio court as to com-
petency and trustworthiness.64 This was dearly recognized by a recent
decision in Ohio following the Harmon case."5 The two phrases cannot
boast the common law background that gives to such standards as "good
moral character,"" "gross immorality,"67 and "unfair competition""
a definitive content despite their seeming generality. More than this,
present usage is caught up in the moralistic revulsion which is wont to
ascribe every economic ill to the "chiseler," the "unfair" competitor,
and the "price cutter," and to sublimate the desire for greater profits
into a demand for morality in business. Under these circumstances,
such phrases cannot avoid a state of flux which spells the very negation
of a settled standard.
Of all the twenty-nine bases controlling the denial, revocation, and
suspension of licenses to deal in motor cars, limitation of numbers is
most overtly and at the same time most effectively realized through the
provision, peculiar to Ohio, that every dealer have "an established place
of business used solely and exclusively for the sale of motor vehicles."6 9
Restriction of numbers by means of elimination of what might be called
marginal units has the seeming merit of keeping the business for those
who claim to be in "good standing." That elimination may take various
forms. Where a business is harassed by the competition of a substitute
product, the drive is apt to be against the producers of this effective
substitute. The oleomargarine-butter clash provides the classic example
of success in this method of pruning."0 In other areas different economic
factors will mark for extinction a certain mode of producing or selling
which threatens the older or more orthodox form. Legislative efforts
to ban the competition of second-hand materials in the manufacture of
articles of bedding have been unsuccessful. 7' But on the distribution
04 Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 59 L. Ed. S5z
(19I')G.State, ex tel., Squire v. National City Bank, S6 Ohio App. 401, 1x N.E. (zd) 93
(936). See note 63 supra for the Harmon case.
0 0 Raabe v. State, 7 Ohio App. 1xg, z8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 169 (1917); Myer v.
O'Dwyer, iS Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 1Z9, 24 Ohio Dec. 134 (gx3), aff'd 90 Ohio St. 341,
107 N.E. 759 (1914).
a Rose v. Baxter, 18 Ohio Dec. 6S8, 8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 55o (igoS).
a Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 74 L. Ed. 138 (1929).
09 Ohio G.C. sec. 6302-3 (9).
"
0 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 32 L. Ed. 253 (1888); MeCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1904); Magnano & Co. v. Hamilton, 29z U.S. 4o ,
78 L. Ed. 1o9 (934).
,"Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 70 L. Ed. 654 (1926); Lisiclin v.
Andrews, z6 F. Supp. 88z (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
side relative success has attended such purging in the case of auction"
and trading stamp"5 selling, while chain store taxation has at least
postponed the demise of the corner merchant. 4
The Ohio statutory provision is directed at the rough counterpart
to these "alien" competitors in the automobile business-the fly-by-night
seller of an occasional car, the small-town dealer who must sell other
articles to carry his overhead, the junk dealer who offers to the market
a rebuilt car, and the finance company which employs the market to
absorb the cars it has repossessed. The statute carries, however, no out-
right prohibition against any of these marginal dealers; the requirement
is only that they have an "established place of business" "used solely and
exclusively" for the merchandising of motor cars.7" In the comparatively
early case of Chicago v. Netcher7 this lesser degree of restriction did
not save a statute which sought to break the financial back of department
stores by prohibiting the sale of goods, clothing, jewelry, and drugs in
the same building with meats, butter, and cheese. More recently, how-
ever, the Colorado Act,7" requiring the partitioning of drug and other
stores engaged in the serving of food as well as the vending of mer-
chandise, successfully ran the gamut of judicial scrutiny. Both the fed-
eral and state courts in upholding that act based their opinion substan-
tially on the ground that "while there was a sharp conflict in the opinion
of experts in the field on health . . . , there is substantial evidence that
the requirement as to a separate room will tend to promote and protect
public health." 7 The Supreme Court of the United States in a per
curiam opinion" affirmed the lower federal court on the strength of
Most but not all courts have sustained various types of restrictions designed to take
the profit out of auction selling. Holsman v. Thomas, iiz Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750
(19z5) (requirement of permanency in ownership and business activity); Gordon v. City
of Indianapolis, zo4 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (193z) (sales limited to 3o days per year);
Alogul v. Gaithcr, i4z Nld. 38o, 2z2 Atl. 3z (9z3) (combining both of the above);
Biddes v. Enright, 239 N.Y. 354, 146 N.E. 6z5 (i9z5) (prohibiting sales under artificial
light). Contra: People v. Gibbs, iS6 Mich. 127, 15z N.W. 2053 (1915) (prohibiting all
but daytime sales); Commonwealth v. Loeb, 245 Ky. 843, 54 S.W (zd) 373 (1932)
(permanency requirements). In Meyers v. Copelan, 117 Ohio St. 6zz, 16o N.E. 85S
(19z7), complete prohibition was sustained 3 to 4 in a peculiar situation arising out of
the interpretation of Ohio Const. Art. IV, sec. z.
" Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 34z, 6o L. Ed. 679 (2926); State v
Wilson, o Kan. 789, 168 Pac. 679 (1917). The earlier state decisions, unfavorable for
the most part are collected in Notes (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 779; (z916) 64 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 734.
"'State Board of Tax Comm. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 75 L. Ed. 1248 (1931);
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., z94 U.S. 87, 79 L. Ed. 780 (1935); Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 302 U.S. 42Z, Si L. Ed. 1293 (2937).
"' Opinions of the Attorney General, 3232 (1938).
7. 283 Ill. xo4, S5 N.E. 707 (2899) •
77 Colo. Laws 1935, c. I S.
7' Opinion of the Justices, 97 Colo. 587, 597 (2935); Kress & Co. v. Johnson, 16
F. Supp. S (1936); Noted (2937) zz Iowa L. Rev. 736.
"Kress & Co. v. Johnson, 299 U.S. 5i, Si L. Ed. 378 (2936).
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Powell v. Pennsylvania," Price v. Illinois,8 Standard Oil Co. v. City
of MaryssAlle82 and Nebbia v. New York."3 A summary of the four
cases shows very well the Supreme Court's attitude toward legislative
discretion in the matter of police regulation. In the Price and Standard
Oil Co. cases the Court said that it was plainly not enough in demon-
strating the invalidity of legislation that the subject matter should be
debatable. If debatable, the legislature is entitled to its own judgment,
and it is enough that the statute has some evidence to support its declara-
tion that the public health and safety will be promoted. The Powell
and Nebbia cases are rested upon the premise that every possible presump-
tion is in favor of the validity of a statute, a presumption which continues
until the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if some
evidence is presented favorable to the legislative action a declaration of
unconstitutionality is impossible. But it must be borne in mind that the
sale of food and merchandise in close proximity can raise some question
of contamination, and no proof is needed that the courts are zealous
guardians of the public health. Against this is to be set the extreme diffi-
culty of demonstrating any kind of danger resulting from the sale of
automobiles in the same establishment with refrigerators, automobile
finance loans, or junk, although something of a case can perhaps be
made out for the requirement of a principal place of business. Even
under the Kress view, then, the quantum of governmental power
exerted may be condemned as wanting in any support save from the
unacceptable thesis that public welfare justifies a limitation on the num-
ber who engage in ordinary callings.
More than this, however, while the Ohio statutory provision on its
face does not prevent one from dealing in both automobiles and other
articles, realism compels the conclusion that such must be the practical
consequence of its enforcement. For the requirement of a principal place
of business devoted solely to the separate business of car-selling, is suffi-
cient to sever the thread of profit by which the marginal dealer hangs
and consequently to blot him out of the competitive picture. By both
federal and state statutes, various business activities under the same
common ownership have been expressly prohibited and the courts have
received these statutes favorably where it was shown that the effect of
the statute was to prevent monopolistic tendencies.8 4 Even where the
80 127 U.S. 678, 32 L. Ed. Z53 (x888).
z' 238 U.S. 446, 59 L. Ed. 1400 (x915).
82 279 U.S. 582, 73 L. Ed. 856 (igzg).
83 291 U.s. 502, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934)-
84 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.s. 322, 53 L. Ed. 530 (1909); United
States v. Delaware & Hudson Co, 213 U.S. 367, 53 L. Ed. 836 (x9og); Crescent Cotton
Oil Co. v. Mississippi 257 U.S. i29, 66 L. Ed. 166 (i92i); Federal Trade Commission
v. Western Meat Co, 272 U.S. 554, 7 L. Ed. 405 (igz6).
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evidence showed no attempt to monopolize in fact, the possibility of it
was sufficient to sustain a statute requiring ownership of theaters to be
separated from the production of the films."' But this has been the
limit of judicial tolerance; where the possibility of a monopoly was
wholly lacking, a statute prohibiting a public utility from selling gas
and electrical appliances has been held unconstitutional.8" The Ohio
provision thus necessarily falls without the area of judicial approbation,
for its very purpose is to restrict rather than to enlarge the group engaged
in selling motor cars. So long as courts continue to nurture the monopoly
complex and to determine constitutionality in terms of the perspective
it affords, so long will limitation formulae of the Ohio type, like those
most recently proposed on analogy to utility control, remain in the
shadow of the judges' guillotine.
HENRY M. THULLEN
CORPORATIONS
CORPORATIONS - AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES - ABOLISHING
ACCRUED DIVIDENDS -A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
In the unanimous opinion of the board of directors of the National
Refining Company, payment in cash of the accrued dividends on its
preferred stock would seriously impair the company's working capital.
The board, therefore, submitted to its stockholders for approval an
amendment providing for the issuance of a prior preferred stock with
an option in the present preferred stockholders to exchange each share
of their stock for one and one-third shares of the new prior preferred
stock and three-fourths of a share of common stock. The amendment
was approved by more than the required two-thirds vote of each class of
the outstanding stock.
An action was brought by the dissenting minority holders of the
preferred stock to enjoin the board of directors from putting into opera-
tion this amendment. The Court refused to grant the injunction. John-
son v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938).
By this decision the Supreme Court of Ohio has not only adopted
the progressive view but has forged ahead on the trail that other states
have solicitously tried to clear since the famous case of Trustees of Dart-
" Paramount Pictures Inv. v. Langer, Z3 F. Supp. Sgo (1938).
'6 Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, 137 Kan. 717, z2 Pac. (7d) 958 (x933).
Petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States but later
dismissed because of a procedural defect. Boynton v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 29z U.S. 6ox,
78 L. Ed. 1464 (x934).
